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Introduction 
Once in a generation, the rules of warfare change.  In the early 20th Century, the 
revolution in flight opened up the vast expanse of the skies to military exploitation.1  In the 
middle of the century, the dawn of the atomic age brought about the means for warfare to reach 
previously unimaginable levels of destruction.2  The electronic age has spawned its own 
paradigm-shifting development in human conflict: Warfare in and through cyberspace.  The 
extraordinarily rapid development of cyber networks and electronic capabilities during the 
beginning of the 21st Century has given states the ability to strike their adversaries out of, quite 
literally, thin air. 
In the past, international treaties, conventions, and legal principles, particularly the 
United Nations and its Charter, constructed a framework of rules to govern and restrict the 
conduct of warfare between states.3  While international organizations such as the U.N. lack for 
themselves the coercive ability to police these rules and punish offending states, the existence of  
international fora allows for a unified application of political, economic, and military pressure on 
states that flout the laws of war.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  an	  introductory	  discussion	  of	  how	  air	  power	  changed	  the	  early-­‐20th	  Century	  paradigm	  of	  war,	  see	  SMITHSONIAN	  
INSTITUTE	  PRESS,	  	  THE	  GREAT	  WAR	  IN	  THE	  AIR:	  MILITARY	  AVIATION	  FROM	  1909	  TO	  1921	  (1993).	  
2	  CHUCK	  HANSEN,	  THE	  SWORDS	  OF	  ARMAGEDDON:	  U.S.	  NUCLEAR	  WEAPONS	  DEVELOPMENT	  SINCE	  1945	  (1995).	  
3	  U.N.	  CHARTER	  art.	  1,	  para.	  1	  
The	  Purposes	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  are:	  
1. 	  To	  maintain	  international	  peace	  and	  security,	  to	  take	  effective	  collective	  measures	  for	  the	  prevention	  and	  
removal	  of	  threats	  to	  the	  peace,	  and	  for	  the	  suppression	  of	  acts	  of	  aggression	  or	  other	  breaches	  of	  the	  
peace,	  and	  to	  bring	  about	  by	  peaceful	  means,	  and	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  and	  
international	  law,	  adjustment	  or	  settlement	  of	  international	  disputes	  or	  situations	  which	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  
breach	  of	  the	  peace.	  	  
4	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  U.N.	  peacekeeping	  and	  “peacebuilding”,	  see,	  MICHAEL	  W.	  DOYLE	  &	  NICHOLAR	  SAMBANIS,	  MAKING	  
WAR	  AND	  BUILDING	  PEACE:	  	  UNITED	  NATIONS	  PEACE	  OPERATIONS	  (2006).	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The advent of the age of cyber warfare threatens to obliterate the credibility and political-
moral force behind the U.N. Charter and the ability of the law of war to effectively govern 
interstate conflict.  The Charter’s provisions were drafted for an era of warfare in which massive 
bodies of soldiers, aircraft, and naval forces crossed clearly demarcated borders and left little 
doubt as to when an act of war had occurred.5  In 1945, when the United Nations came into 
existence, there was little need for the international community to agonize over the definitions of 
terms such as “use of force6” and “armed attack7”; the charred remains of Europe and East Asia 
were all the definition that was needed.  Unfortunately, cracks and gray areas in the vague 
definitions and prohibitions in the Charter began to appear during the proxy wars of the Cold 
War.  In the present day, the dizzying expansion of cyber capabilities has opened up a myriad of 
new, asymmetric strategic options for states to project military power in ways never 
contemplated by the drafters of the U.N. Charter.   
With the deployment of the Stuxnet virus against the Iranian nuclear program, cyber 
weapons have taken their place alongside traditional, kinetic weapon systems in a state’s 
warfighting arsenal.  While the Charter gives states the right to respond in self-defense when 
they are the victims of an armed attack,8 it provides no guidance for states attempting to form an 
appropriate response or a forward-thinking strategic policy for cyber warfare.   
Using the Stuxnet attack as a basis, this paper demonstrates how two interpretations of 
the U.N. Charter, the traditional “effects-based” approach and a proposed “definitional” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  U.N.	  Charter	  refers	  directly	  to	  World	  Wars	  I	  and	  II	  in	  its	  Preamble:	  
“We	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  determined:	  to	  save	  succeeding	  generations	  from	  the	  scourge	  of	  
war,	  which	  twice	  in	  our	  lifetime	  has	  brought	  untold	  sorrow	  to	  mankind…”	  
6	  U.N.	  CHARTER	  art.	  2	  para.	  4	  
7	  U.N.	  CHARTER	  art.	  51	  
8	  Id.	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approach, both fail to account for the asymmetrical nature of cyber warfare.  The effects-based 
test has long been the standard for states to determine if an armed attack or use of force has 
occurred.9  However, it leaves too much room for states to wage simmering, shadow wars in 
cyberspace, which could easily erupt into a more traditional shooting war, enhanced by an 
escalation in cyber attacks.  The varied means by which a cyber attack may take place, such as 
the length of time between the infiltration of a state’s computer networks and any subsequent 
“trigger”, issues of neutrality when electronic signals pass through neutral states, and problems 
inherent in attributing cyber attacks to specific state actors, have encouraged states to create their 
own cyber strategies unilaterally, with no international oversight.   
On the other hand, the proposed definitional approach takes a much harder line in holding 
states accountable for cyber attacks originating in their territory.  Unfortunately, such an 
approach swings the interpretive pendulum too far to the side of draconian strict liability in 
cyberspace.  An international adherence to the definitional approach risks unneeded and undue 
escalation of a cyber conflict as neutral or truly innocent nations may be held accountable for an 
anonymous signal routed through their servers or originating within their borders.  Only an 
international solution, forged by the U.N. or the international community at large, can update the 
obsolete Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter, thus providing guidance for the conduct of 
warfare in the Cyber Age. 
I.  The Story of Stuxnet 
A.  Cyber Attack in Iran 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Michael	  N.	  Schmitt,	  Computer	  Network	  Attack	  and	  Use	  of	  Force	  in	  International	  Law:	  	  Thoughts	  on	  a	  Normative	  
Framework,	  37	  COLUM.	  J.	  TRANSNAT’L	  L.	  885	  (1999)	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 In Januray 2010, the centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility went haywire.  
Investigators from the International Atomic Energy Agency observed that researchers were 
replacing centrifuges at “an incredible rate.10”  In nuclear enrichment processes, centrifuges are 
used to separate Uranium-23511 from the far more common Uranium-238 isotope.12  Because the 
process involves spinning the centrifuge at rapid velocities in order to separate the uranium 
isotopes, wear and tear is expected and centrifuges are commonly replaced.13  This time, 
however, the IAEA inspectors noticed that the Iranian technicians were replacing their 
centrifuges at more than double the normal rate.14  In May 2010, the IAEA stated the Natanz 
facility contained 3,900 operational centrifuges, a 20% reduction from the number of working 
centrifuges the facility housed one year prior.15  In addition, thousands of installed centrifuges 
were simply idle.16  
 The frantic replacement of centrifuges and subsequent impairment of operations at the 
Natanz facility led many outside observers to believe “there has been a concerted intelligence 
operation which is able to debilitate and set back the Iranian program.17”  The Iranian 
government acknowledged later in 2010 that its nuclear program had indeed been the victim of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  and	  exhilarating	  telling	  of	  the	  Stuxnet	  saga,	  see	  Kim	  Zetter,	  How	  Digital	  Detectives	  
Deciphered	  Stuxnet,	  the	  Most	  Menacing	  Malware	  in	  History,	  WIRED,	  July	  11,	  2011,	  available	  at	  
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-­‐digital-­‐detectives-­‐deciphered-­‐stuxnet/all/1	  (last	  accessed	  March	  
27,	  2012).	  
11	  Uranium	  235	  comprises	  only	  0.78%	  of	  naturally-­‐occurring	  uranium.	  	  As	  the	  only	  fissile	  uranium	  isotope,	  only	  
Uranium	  235	  can	  sustain	  the	  fission	  reaction	  necessary	  for	  nuclear	  weapons	  of	  power	  processes.	  
See,	  e.g.,	  G.W.C.	  KAYE,	  T.H.	  LABY	  ET	  AL.,	  TABLES	  OF	  PHYSICAL	  AND	  CHEMICAL	  CONSTANTs,	  Ch.	  4,	  Sec.	  7	  
12	  Id.	  
13	  Ivan	  Oelrich	  and	  Ivanka	  Barzashka,	  How	  a	  Centrifuge	  Works,	  FEDERATION	  OF	  AMERICAN	  SCIENTISTS,	  Available	  at	  
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/fuelcycle/centrifuges/centrifuge.html	  (last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  2012)	  
14	  See	  Zetter,	  supra	  Note	  9	  at	  1	  
15	  James	  Blitz,	  Daniel	  Dombey	  &	  Roula	  Khalaf,	  Signs	  of	  Sabotage	  in	  Tehran’s	  Nuclear	  Programme,	  FINANCIAL	  TIMES,	  
July	  24,	  2010,	  available	  at	  http://gulfnews.com/news/region/iran/signs-­‐of-­‐sabotage-­‐in-­‐tehran-­‐s-­‐nuclear-­‐
programme-­‐1.658481	  (last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  2012)	  
16	  Id.	  
17	  Id.	  	  “A	  large	  number	  of	  Iranian	  centrifuges	  have	  crashed	  and	  up	  to	  half	  have	  had	  to	  be	  replaced	  in	  recent	  times.	  
This	  success	  didn't	  happen	  entirely	  accidentally.”	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an electronic attack.18  Iran has understandably downplayed the impact the attack left on the 
country’s nuclear program, making any damage assessment difficult.  Some Iranian officials 
initially claimed that the attack did not reach any nuclear components or critical systems,19 but 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad admitted, in November 2010, that the attack had “creat[ed] 
problems for a limited number of our centrifuges.20” President Ahmadinejad went on to claim 
that any problems had been corrected and the Natanz facility was fully operational.21  
International observers are skeptical of this claim, noting multiple instances of disruption in the 
Natanz facility throughout 2010 and into 2011.22 
 
B.  Stuxnet – The World’s First Cyber Weapon 
 The perpetrator of the mayhem unleashed on the Iranian nuclear program was an 
exquisitely crafted computer virus that has come to be known as Stuxnet.  Stuxnet was identified 
in June 2010 by VirusBlokAda, a small online security firm in Belarus.  VirusBlokAda received 
a complaint from a client in Iran whose computer was trapped in a reboot loop.23  A reboot loop 
is a clear sign of a computer virus, and the Belorussian technicians were not surprised to find that 
just such a malware program had infected their client’s computer.24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Atul	  Aneja,	  Under	  Cyber-­‐Attack,	  Says	  Iran,	  THE	  HINDU,	  September	  26,	  2010,	  available	  at	  
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article797363.ece	  (last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  2012)	  
19	  Stuxnet	  Worm	  Hits	  Iran	  Nuclear	  Plant	  Staff	  Computers,	  BBC	  NEWS,	  September	  26,	  2010,	  available	  at	  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐11414483	  (last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  2012)	  
20	  Mark	  Clayton:	  	  Stuxnet:	  	  Ahmadinejad	  Admits	  Cyberweapon	  Hit	  Iran	  Nuclear	  Problem,	  CHRISTIAN	  SCIENCE	  MONITOR,	  
November	  30,	  2010,	  available	  at	  http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1130/Stuxnet-­‐Ahmadinejad-­‐admits-­‐
cyberweapon-­‐hit-­‐Iran-­‐nuclear-­‐program	  (last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  2012)	  
21	  Id.	  
22	  Id.	  
23	  See	  Zetter,	  Supra	  Note	  10	  	  
24	  Id.	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 When they cracked into the virus, however, the team at VirusBlokAda immediately 
realized Stuxnet was far more than just a simple prankster or hacker’s virus.25  First, the size of 
the file was huge.  Whereas almost all malware programs or files come in at about 50 kilobytes, 
Stuxnet was huge: almost half a megabyte in size.26  Additionally, the virus’ files were more 
complex, camouflaged, and multi-layered than any malware program on record.27  VirusBlokAda 
shared their initial findings with the private, interconnected cybersecurity community, sparking a 
months-long investigation of Stuxnet by the top private firms and researchers in the world.28 
 The combined efforts of the global cybersecurity community revealed the following 
about the Stuxnet virus:  Stuxnet originally spread to the infected networks by way of infected 
USB devices, enabling it to reach computer networks not connected to the wider Internet.29  
Once planted onto a victim computer, Stuxnet was designed to seek out and attack a single 
component of software designed by Siemens AG30 for use in controlling manufacturing 
processes.31  Once in place on a single computer, Stuxnet “searched” for the specific Siemens 
software.  If the Siemens software was not present, the virus would simply go inert, burying 
itself undetected in the computer system.32  If Stuxnet detected the Siemens software, it used 
peer-to-peer methods to spread to other computers on the same private network as the original 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Id.	  
26	  Id.	  
27	  Id.	  
28	  Id.	  
29	  Id.	  
30	  Siemens	  is	  a	  large	  German	  technology	  conglomerate	  based	  in	  Munich.	  
31	  Information	  on	  Siemens	  industrial	  control	  software	  can	  be	  found	  at	  
http://www.automation.siemens.com/mcms/topics/en/simatic/Pages/Default.aspx	  
32	  See	  Zetter,	  Supra	  Note	  10	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infected system.33  Nearly 60% of all Stuxnet-infected computers worldwide were located in 
Iran, a staggering concentration for a computer virus.34 
 Stuxnet’s actions once it infiltrated the Siemens-equipped computers reveal its intended 
target.  When cybersecurity experts cracked into the inner workings of Stuxnet’s code, they 
discovered that the virus had one specific kind of action to perform: 
Once [Stuxnet] infects a system, it searches for the presence of two kinds of frequency 
converters made by the Iranian firm Fararo Paya and the Finnish company Vacon, 
making it clear that the code has a precise target in its sights. Once it finds itself on the 
targeted system, depending on how many frequency converters from each company are 
present on that system, Stuxnet undertakes two courses of action to alter the speed of 
rotors being controlled by the converters. In one of these courses of action, Stuxnet 
begins with a nominal frequency of 1,064 Hz — which matches the known nominal 
frequency at Natanz but is above the 1,007 Hz at which Natanz is said to operate — then 
reduces the frequency for a short while before returning it back to 1,064 Hz.  
 
In another attack sequence, Stuxnet instructs the speed to increase to 1,410 Hz, which is 
“very close to the maximum speed the spinning aluminum IR-1 rotor can withstand 
mechanically,” according to the ISIS report, which was written by ISIS president David 
Albright and colleagues.  The stresses from the excessive, then slower, speeds cause 
the aluminum centrifugal tubes to expand, often forcing parts of the centrifuges 
into sufficient contact with each other to destroy the machine.35  
 
 In short, Stuxnet was designed to induce malfunctions in the centrifuges within Iran’s 
nuclear enrichment facilities.  It searched out systems running one specialized kind of industrial-
control software, cracked into specific components of that software – the frequency controls for 
centrifuges – and subtly manipulated them into a sustained breakdown.36  The sheer size and 
complexity of the virus, its exclusive distribution inside Iran, and its specific target profile,37 led 
the cybersecurity community to nearly unanimously conclude that Stuxnet was designed solely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Id.	  
34	  Id.	  
35	  DAVID	  ALBRIGHT,	  PAUL	  BRANNAN,	  &	  CHRISTINA	  WALRond,	  INSTITUTE	  FOR	  SCIENCE	  AND	  INTERNATIONAL	  SECURITY,	  DID	  STUXNET	  
TAKE	  OUT	  1,000	  CENTRIFUGES	  AT	  THE	  NATANZ	  ENRICHMENT	  PLANT?	  at	  11,	  	  December	  22,	  2012.	  
36	  Id.	  at	  13	  
37	  See	  Zetter,	  Supra	  Note	  10	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to attack the Iranian nuclear program.38  One observer, in a telling analogy, compared the Stuxnet 
cyber attack to “a commando raid in the heart of Iran.”39 
 Symantec, one of the world’s best-known online security companies, estimates that the 
creation of a malware code like Stuxnet would have taken dozens of designers months, if not 
over a year.40    Some have gone on to conclude that Stuxnet’s development was “the largest and 
costliest development effort in malware history.”41  The code was so complex, so wrapped in 
layers upon layers of encryption, misdirection, and stealth protocol, that most believe only a state 
actor could have possessed the technical know-how, funding , and (most importantly), motive to 
create such a virus.42   
 The universal perception of Stuxnet is fascinating to observe.  Virtually every observer to 
comment on Stuxnet, from government bodies on down to individual technology bloggers, has 
either used military analogies (such as the commando raid description above) or outright 
declared the Stuxnet event to be the equivalent of a military attack.  As one commenter put it, 
Stuxnet “it saved the Iranians a good old-fashioned bombing.43”  Inartfulness aside, this 
commenter points out an emerging reality of warfare: Cyber attacks have now taken their place 
among airstrikes or ground assaults in the strategic arsenal of the world’s nation-states.  In a 
December 2010 report, the Congressional Research Service classified Stuxnet as a “harbinger of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Gregg	  Keizer,	  New	  Stuxnet	  Clues	  Suggest	  Sabotage	  of	  Iran’s	  Nuclear	  Enrichment	  Program,	  ComputerWorld,	  
November	  15,	  2010,	  available	  at	  
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9196458/New_Stuxnet_clues_suggest_sabotage_of_Iran_s_uranium_e
nrichment_program	  (last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  2012)	  
39	  Gregg	  Keizer,	  Is	  Stuxnet	  the	  ‘Best’	  Malware	  Ever?	  	  COMPUTERWORLD,	  September	  16,	  2010,	  available	  at	  
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9185919/Is_Stuxnet_the_best_malware_ever_?	  (last	  accessed	  March	  
27,	  2012)	  
40	  See	  Zetter,	  Supra	  Note	  10	  	  
41	  Id.	  
42	  Id.	  	  
43 Marcus	  J.	  Ranum,	  Cyberwar:	  About	  Stuxnet ,	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  warfare?,	  FABIUS	  MAXIMUS,	  29	  September	  
2011,	  http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2011/09/29/29291/	  (last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  2012)	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an emerging warfare capability.44”  The explosive growth of cyberwarfare capabilities and 
doctrines across the world which culminated in the release of Stuxnet will be examined in the 
next section. 
 
II.  A New Era of Warfare 
A.  Cyber War in the United States 
The United States has been slowly integrating cybersecurity and cyber warfare 
capabilities into its national security apparatus since the 1990’s.45  The pace of cyber integration 
surged in the mid-2000’s, as the capabilities of the Internet exploded and fears of outside 
penetration of sensitive networks and computer systems came to pass.46  In 2008, the 
Department of Defense brought cyberspace under the umbrella of military conflict, assigning 
the realm of cyberspace to the United States Air Force.  The Air Force changed its official 
mission to include the domination of cyberspace, alongside the traditional domains of “air” and 
“space.47” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  CONGRESSIONAL	  RESEARCH	  SERVICE,	  THE	  STUXNET	  COMPUTER	  WORM:	  HARBINGER	  OF	  AN	  EMERGING	  WARFARE	  CAPABILITY,	  
December	  9,	  2010.	  
45	  Bruce	  D.	  Berkowitz,	  War	  Logs	  On:	  	  Girding	  America	  for	  Computer	  Combat,	  FOREIGN	  AFFAIRS,	  May/June	  2000	  	  (“In	  
Kosovo,	  America	  stumbled	  into	  the	  age	  of	  computer	  warfare.	  Now	  Washington	  must	  think	  hard	  about	  how	  to	  
attack	  its	  foes’	  electronic	  networks	  and	  defend	  its	  own.”)	  
46	  In	  2007,	  a	  “spearphishing”	  attack	  struck	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  	  The	  attacker(s)	  sent	  spoofed	  e-­‐mails	  
containing	  recognizable	  names	  were	  OSD	  employees.	  When	  they	  opened	  the	  messages,	  user	  IDs	  and	  passwords	  
that	  unlocked	  the	  entire	  network	  were	  stolen;	  as	  a	  result,	  sensitive	  data	  housed	  on	  Defense	  systems	  was	  accessed,	  
copied	  and	  sent	  back	  to	  the	  intruder.	  	  See,	  SANS	  INSTITUTE,	  PHISHING:	  	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  A	  GROWING	  PROBLEM,	  December	  
2007,	  available	  at	  http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/threats/phishing-­‐analysis-­‐growing-­‐
problem_1417	  (last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  2012)	  
47	  “About	  the	  Air	  Force:	  	  Our	  Mission”,	  	  www.airforce.com/learn-­‐about/our-­‐mission/	  (last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  
2012)	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 In 2006, the Air Force announced its intentions to develop Air Force Cyber Command 
(AFCYBER), which would be commanded by a 3-Star General and operate as a Major 
Command (MAJCOM), the broadest sub-division of the Air Force.48  Those plans were scrapped 
in 2008, as the DOD decided on an even broader role for cyber military forces.  Instead of 
placing the responsibility for cyber warfare completely under the Air Force’s purview, the DOD 
created United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).49  The proposed Air Force Cyber 
Command was rolled into USCYBERCOM as the 24th Air Force.50  Because USCYBERCOM 
operates as an entity of the DOD, rather than a specific military branch, it is able to synergize 
operations among the cyber arms of the Air Force, Army, and Navy.51 
The mission of USCYBERCOM is as follows: 
USCYBERCOM is responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating, 
synchronizing, and directing activities to operate and defend the Department of 
Defense information networks and when directed, conducts full-spectrum military 
cyberspace operations (in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations) in 
order to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while denying the 
same to our adversaries.52 
 
 The United States government has instituted a sweeping program to defend civilian 
computer networks as well as to project military power through cyberspace.  Under the USA 
PATRIOT Act and subsequent legislation, the job of protecting nonmilitary government and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  As	  a	  MAJCOM,	  Air	  Force	  Cyber	  command	  would	  have	  operated	  alongside	  units	  such	  as	  Air	  Combat	  Command,	  
Strategic	  Command,	  and	  Air	  Force	  Material	  Command.	  	  Each	  MAJCOM	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  a	  distinct,	  crucial	  portion	  of	  
the	  Air	  Force’s	  mission.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  Cyber	  Command	  would	  have	  risen	  to	  the	  MAJCOM	  level	  is	  a	  key	  indicator	  
of	  the	  importance	  of	  cyber	  warfare	  to	  the	  future	  military.	  
49	  Jeremy	  Hsu,	  U.S.	  Cyber	  Command	  Now	  Online,	  and	  Seeking	  a	  Few	  Good	  Geeks,	  POPULAR	  SCIENCE,	  October	  5,	  2009	  
50	  GEN.	  C.	  ROBERT	  KEHLER,	  24TH	  AIR	  FORCE	  ACTIVATION,	  August	  19,	  2009,	  
http://www.24af.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123163965	  
51	  USCYBERCOM	  includes	  U.S.	  Army	  Cyber	  Command	  (Second	  Army),	  U.S.	  Navy	  Fleet	  Cyber	  Command,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  
Marine	  Corps	  Cyberspace	  Command.	  
52	  “U.S.	  Cyber	  Command	  Factsheet”,	  http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command/	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civilian networks has fallen to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).53  DHS is in the 
process of introducing a standardized information security system that will cover every 
unclassified, civilian computer network in the federal government.54  Known as EINSTEIN, this 
security protocol is designed to make mirror copies of all data packets transferred through 
government networks and screen those packets for malicious code or other threats.55 
 How DHS and USCYBERCOM would work together in together in the event of a 
massive cyber attack is unclear at the present time.  If Stuxnet were to strike computer networks 
in the United States, how would the overlapping agencies respond and what would be their 
respective operating fields?  A few statements from key members of the new cyber warfare 
apparatus are illuminating.  In July 2011, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn stated,  
[USCYBERCOM fields] a full spectrum of capabilities, but the thrust of the 
strategy is defensive.  The strategy rests on five pillars…(T)reat cyber as a 
domain; employ more active defenses; support the Department of Homeland 
Security in protecting critical infrastructure networks; practice collective defense 
with allies and international partners; and reduce the advantages attackers have on 
the Internet.56 
 Secretary Lynn’s remarks mirror the DOD Cyberwarfare Strategy, released in July of 
2011.57 
 General Keith Alexander, commander of USCYBERCOM, stated “If [a cyber strike is] 
determined to be an organized attack, I would primarily want to go and take down the source of 
those attacks.58” 
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  Stephen	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  Bradbury,	  The	  Developing	  Legal	  Framework	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  Cyber	  Operations:	  Keynote	  
Address,	  2011	  Harvard	  National	  Security	  Journal	  Symposium,	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  (2011).	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  Id.	  
55	  Id.	  	  	  
56	  Karen	  Parrish,	  Lynn:	  Cyber	  Security’s	  Thrust	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  Defensive,	  AMERICAN	  FORCES	  PRESS	  SERVICE,	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  2011,	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  accessed	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  UNITED	  STATES	  DEPARTMENT	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  DEFENSE,	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  STRATEGY	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  OPERATING	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  July	  2011	  
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf	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 Based on these strategic positions and doctrines, it appears the civilian cyber security 
apparatus would be responsible for “combatting” any cyber attack that pierced any non-military 
infrastructure (with DOD support and resources if necessary).59  What is certainly clear is that 
the United States government is racing to fit cyber warfare capability into its strategic and legal 
arsenal.  The next sections will detail how other nations are also driving headlong into the 
unknown, based on their own legal principles and historical circumstances. 
 
B.  Cyber Militarization in Russia 
Since the early 2000’s, Russian military leaders have enthusiastically embraced the adoption 
of cyber weapons.60  Used in a conventional military capacity, Russia envisions its cyber 
weapons as a “force multiplier.61”  In military strategy, a force multiplier is a component of a 
military force that increases the effectiveness or fighting efficiency of a unit or group.62  Like all 
offensive cyber strategies, Russia's includes the capability to disrupt the information 
infrastructure of their enemies and includes strategies that would attack financial markets and 
military and civilian communications capabilities as well as other parts of an enemy's critical 
infrastructure prior to the initiation of traditional military operations.63  Additionally, rumors 
have swirled for years that the Russian government maintains close ties with various 
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  Ryan	  Singel,	  Cyberwar	  Commander	  Survives	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  WIRED,	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  15,	  2010,	  available	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http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/cyberwar-­‐commander/	  
59	  Bradbury,	  Supra	  Note	  53	  at	  371.	  
60	  KEIR	  GIELS,	  “INFORMATION	  TROOPS”	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  RUSSIAN	  CYBER	  COMMAND?	  At	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  International	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  2011.	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  Warfare	  Operations:	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  Rev.	  
121,	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  Id.	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  Id.	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“underworld” organizations within Russia, providing them with tools and tacit support to launch 
cyber vandalism, espionage, and other activities.64 
The world may have already received several previews of what a Russian cyber war action 
would entail.  In 2007, the Estonian government announced plans to relocate the Bronze Soldier 
of Talinn, a Soviet-era statute commemorating Russian soldiers who died liberating Estonia from 
Germany during World War II, from the city’s central square.65  The removal sparked a brief but 
intense diplomatic dispute with Russia.66  On April 27, 2007, a wave of cyberattacks swamped 
Estonian government, banking, and political party sites.67  The attacks were almost entirely 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)68 strikes.  While the DDoS attacks themselves were not 
very sophisticated,69 the breadth and coordination of the cyber attack led many observers to 
conclude that the attacks could not have been carried out without the blessing of the Russian 
authorities and that the hackers apparently acted under "recommendations" from parties in the 
Russian Government.70  While the DDoS attacks were traced back to sources in Russia and 
Eastern Europe, they could not be connected to the Russian government.71 
In 2008, Russia and Georgia went to war over the breakaway Georgian provinces of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.72  As Russian troops crossed the border into Georgia, “a multi-faceted 
cyber attack” began against the Georgian communication infrastructure and key government web 
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  ENEKEN	  TIKK,	  ANNA-­‐MARIA	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  ATTACKS	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  GEORGIA:	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  LEARNED,	  Cooperative	  Cyber	  
Defense	  Center	  (2008)	  at	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65	  BBC	  News,	  Estonia	  to	  Remove	  Soviet	  Memorial,	  January	  12,	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  available	  at	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6255051.stm	  (last	  accessed	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  Joshua	  Davis,	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  WIRED,	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  2007.	  
68	  In	  a	  DDoS	  strike,	  the	  cyber	  attacker	  uses	  a	  network	  of	  linked	  computers	  (known	  as	  “bots”)	  to	  flood	  the	  targeted	  
server	  with	  information	  requests,	  causing	  the	  server	  to	  shut	  down	  under	  the	  strain.	  
69	  Supra	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sites.73  Georgian government websites were defaced or brought offline by DDoS attacks, along 
with Georgian internet and phone service providers.74 Once again, the Russian government 
denied launching the cyber attacks.75  Much like the Estonian cyber attacks, however, outside 
experts, analyzing the coordination and complexity of the attacks (the first strikes occurred 
almost exactly as Russian troops made their first moves over the border), concluded that, while 
non-governmental “hacktivists” were the likely culprits, they did so with under-the-table support 
or encouragement from Moscow.76 
The Russian example, particularly the use of cyber attacks during the 2008 war with Georgia, 
reveals how a small-scale cyber war could be conducted.  The attacks fit the Russian 
government’s “force multiplier” views of cyber warfare; the attacks were intended to diminish 
Georgian morale and undermine government operations, a classic support strategy.  However, 
the decentralized nature of the Internet means that the cyber attacks could not be attributed to the 
Kremlin.  As this paper will show, problems with attribution of cyber attacks are one of the key 
factors that hamper the application of existing international legal regimes to cyber warfare.  
Russia seems to have figured this out. 
 
C.  Chinese Cyber Warriors 
 When most American politicians speak of cyber security threats, the first country they 
mention is almost always China.  China currently possesses a significant cyber weapons and 
intelligence infrastructure, and their cyber warfare doctrine is designed to achieve global 
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"electronic dominance" by 2050. This includes the capability of disrupting the information 
infrastructure of their enemies.77 In 1999, the PLA Daily, the official media outlet for the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA), stated, "Internet warfare is of equal significance to land, sea, 
and air power and requires its own military branch.”78  According to military and intelligence 
sources, Chinese cyber forces have developed detailed plans for cyber attacks against the United 
States and others.79 A 2007 Department of Defense report indicated the PLA had established 
information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, 
and tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems and networks.80 A Congressional 
Research Service Report noted that China was pursuing the concept of a Net Force, which would 
consist of a strong reserve force of computer experts trained at a number of universities and 
training centers.81 In 2005, the PLA began to incorporate offensive computer network operations 
into its exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy networks.82 
 Chinese sources were the likely culprits in some of the most complex and extensive 
intrusions into U.S. government computer networks on record.83  Unlike the dramatic attacks on 
Estonia and Georgia (particularly the Georgian attack, which coincided with a military 
operation) carried out by Russian actors, cyber attacks originating from China have largely been 
in the realm of espionage.84  In 2003, for example, a group of Chinese hackers code named 
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“Titan Rain” stole military research information and broke into the computer systems of 
government agencies.85   The Chinese military sponsors regular computer hacking tournaments 
in order to discover and cultivate talented young computer warriors.86 
 The world’s major powers have spent the last decade integrating cyber capabilities into 
their arsenals.  From espionage, as in the case of China, to the smaller-scale attacks that 
supported Russia’s invasion of Georgia, to the precision strike of Stuxnet, states now have the 
ability to fight their wars in cyberspace.  From this point, the question focuses on how cyber 
warfare capabilities can be utilized in accordance with international treaties, agreements, and 
conventions.  The following section will outline the United Nations prohibition on “use of force” 
between member states, the corresponding rights of states to defend themselves against “armed 
attack”, and the intractable problems cyber weapons such as Stuxnet pose when a government is 
trying to figure out if it has been the victim of a use of force or armed attack. 
 
III.  The Law of Cyber War 
A. Article 2(4) and Article 51 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter establishes the blanket prohibition on the use of force 
between U.N. Member States.  “All members shall refrain…from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state….87”  As a corollary, 
Article 51 of the Charter guarantees “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
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an armed attack occurs against a Member.88”  Because neither “use of force” nor “armed attack” 
are defined in the Charter, the two Articles often overlap.  Interpretation by international 
powers, long experience, and academic consensus has established that Articles 2(4) and 51 
apply to “military attacks or armed violence” only.89  As the primary risk of cyber warfare lies 
in potentially uninhibited escalation in an international legal vacuum, the key question is, in 
terms of Article 51, can a cyber attack trigger a state’s right to use military force to defend 
itself?  In the age of Stuxnet, can a cyber attack rise to the level of an “armed attack?”   
As mentioned previously, the U.N. Charter does not define what constitutes an “armed 
attack.”  Fortunately, a look at other U.N. documents helps form a definition of the term.  As to 
what constitutes an armed attack, U.N. Resolution 3314 contains a definition of the term 
“aggression” for use in the military context.  “Aggression” is defined as “use of force                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state.90”  
Examples given in the Resolution include: 
Invasion, attack, or military occupation; bombardment or the use 
of any weapons against a State; blockade; an attack on the land, 
sea, or air forces or the marine and air fleets of a State; and the 
sending of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries to 
complete any of the previous acts.91 
 
 Resolution 3314 qualifies the right to self-defense against aggression by instituting a 
principle of  proportionality governing the responses available to victims of military aggression.  
Additionally, the Resolution states that a state action meeting the criteria above that an act must 
be of “sufficient gravity” in order to be classified as aggression.  Combining the elements of 
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“aggression” and “armed attack,” scholars have largely agreed that the right of a state to self-
defense is triggered only in the case of clear and defined invasion of national sovereignty 
through military action.92 
 
B.  When Does the Use of a Cyber Weapon Constitute an Armed Attack? 
 
1.  Effects-Based Tests 
 The traditional legal framework for analyzing when an aggressive action by a state rises 
to the level of an armed attack places the key analysis on the effects of the action on the victim 
state.93  There are two common effects-based tests that have achieved common use among 
international legal scholars who have ventured into the issue of cyber war.  These approaches 
attempt to fuse pre-existing canons of interpretation for the U.N. Charter with the difficulties 
presented by cyber warfare.  Unfortunately, each traditional test falls short. 
 
i. Equivalent Effects Test 
 The Equivalent Effects test is the simplest of the formulas used to postulate whether a 
cyber attack meets the “Armed Attack” threshold.  The Equivalent Effects test “requires that [a 
cyber attack] must result in the same consequences as kinetic attack and physical invasion by 
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traditional military forces.94”  This was the first position adopted by the United States 
Department of Defense regarding the legal framework governing DOD’s use of cyberspace.95   
 The Equivalent Effects Test is an attempt to graft cyber weapons directly onto the current 
U.N. Charter legal regime.  Under this test, the 2007 and 2008 Russian cyber attacks in Estonia 
and Georgia would not rise to the level of an armed attack.  The defacement of government and 
commercial websites, while a valuable component of a full-spectrum assault, is not the effect that 
any kinetic, traditional military assault would have on the Georgian and Estonian cyber 
networks.  A missile might destroy a server, and thus deny access to its users, but a purely 
electronic attack that overloads the server does no physical damage.  The effects of the cyber 
attacks in Georgia and Estonia were on a different level than the results of any of Russia’s 
military operations.96   
 An analysis of Stuxnet under the Equivalent Effects Test is much more difficult, and 
ultimately reveals the inability of the Equivalent Effects Test to properly classify the use of 
today’s modern cyber weapons.  Unlike the simple DDoS attacks and website-alteration used in 
Estonia and Georgia, Stuxnet sought out and physically damaged Iran’s nuclear research 
infrastructure.97  Comparisons to the effect of a cruise missile or a commando raid quickly spring 
to mind.   
 While these analogies are valid, Stuxnet created effects that were far more limited than an 
airstrike or commando operation.  An airstrike would have created considerable collateral 
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damage to the Natanz facility, destroying far more than the targeted centrifuges.   The effects of 
a commando raid to destroy Natanz’ centrifuges are difficult to predict, but the process of 
inserting and retrieving the attacking forces is far more likely to result in the destruction of 
property and lives outside of the narrow objective.  The Equivalent Effects Test fails because it 
treats cyber attacks as something outside of “traditional” military actions.  As this paper has 
demonstrated, cyber weapons have been integrated into the military arms of the significant world 
powers.  This integration renders the search for an “equivalent effect” obsolete.  Cyber attacks 
should not be compared to older methods of military action as if they operate in some other 
reality.  They are their own weapons, capable of achieving unique military objectives. 
ii. Schmitt Test 
 Professor Michael Schmitt developed a framework for analyzing cyber attacks as 
potential armed attacks falling under Article 51.98  His test attempts to combine the recognition 
of the military applications of cyber weapons with the reality that not all cyber attacks will meet 
the armed attack threshold.99  Schmitt’s analysis focuses on seven factors on a case-by-case 
basis. 
1. Severity – How many people were killed, and how much damage was 
inflicted? 
2. Immediacy – How fast and unexpected was the military action? 
3. Directness – Is there a clear cause and effect relationship? 
4. Invasiveness – Are militaries crossing borders, causing substantial 
effects? 
5. Measurability – How accurately can the effects be calculated? 
6. Presumptive Legitimacy – Is the cyber attack an action that 
presumably takes a country to accomplish, indicating a high level of 
coordination? 
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7. Responsibility – Which nation’s military forces were responsible?100 
   
 Professor Schmitt’s test creates a spectrum upon which an individual cyber attack can be 
measured and compared.  For example, Schimtt finds that a cyber attack that shuts down air 
traffic control systems, causing airplane crashes and significant casualties, would constitute an 
armed attack under Article 51.101  On the other end of the spectrum, Schmitt cites the scenario of 
a malware code used to crash a university computer system in order to delay government 
research as not sufficient to constitute an armed attack.102  
 Where does Stuxnet fall under the Schmitt analysis?  The Stuxnet virus wreaked havoc 
on a critical Iranian computer system, causing extensive and expensive damage.  The sensitive, 
precise nature of the Stuxnet strike combined with the importance of the target computer system 
points in the direction of Schmitt’s air traffic control scenario.  However, the attack did not cause 
any casualties and did not cause collateral damage outside of the Natanz facility.  Additionally, 
Stuxnet struck a research project, the kind of target Schmitt did not believe was important 
enough to trigger self-defense rights under Article 51.103  The balance of the factors, however, 
favors treating Stuxnet as an armed attack under the Schmitt Test.  Stuxnet caused physical 
damage to the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, was highly invasive, its damage was quantifiable,104 
and it was almost certainly created under the auspices of a national government. 
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 While Schmitt’s analysis provides a modicum of the flexibility and close analysis that 
states need when evaluating whether an attack against their cyber networks has triggered their 
Article 51 right to self-defense, the real-world example of Stuxnet reveals that even the in-depth 
Schmitt Test is unworkable in the event of a modern cyber conflict.  Like the equivalent effects 
test, the Schmitt Test is an academic exercise that, while “quite helpful academically, is not 
easily applicable in an operational setting.105”  When a military crisis occurs, time is of the 
essence.  A state government needs a fast, streamlined analysis of its legal and military options, 
particularly in the case of a cyber attack, which may be the prelude to kinetic military strikes.106  
Likewise, the intent, origin, and effects of a cyber attack might not be known for months or years 
after the initial manifestation of the attack.  For example, Stuxnet was probably introduced into 
Iran six months to a year before its activation.107  Finally, the effects of the Stuxnet attack took 
months to reveal themselves, and are still not fully known.  Older tests meant to apply Articles 
2(4) and 51 to traditional military actions do not translate well to the cyber realm.108 
 
2. Fundamental Flaws of Effects-Based Tests 
 
 For all the practical encumbrances that weaken the application of effects-based tests in 
determining if a cyber attack is an armed attack according to Article 51, the greatest flaw in the 
traditional tests rests upon the seemingly simple issues of attribution and identification of any 
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attackers.  The infrastructure of the internet allows attackers to route their attacks through 
multiple systems in multiple countries far from the true source.  This is exactly what the makers 
of Stuxnet did.109  As the previous analysis of Stuxnet and the Georgian-Estonian cyber attacks 
reveals, even the most advanced forensic technology will have a difficult, if not impossible, time 
attempting to link cyber attacks or intrusions to a specific source.110 
 Even if investigators are able to follow an electronic attack through a complicated tunnel 
of servers across the world, they may find themselves “stymied by a collision between 
fundamental principles of physics and those of international law.111”  The electrons which 
comprise cyber transmissions flow largely unimpeded across borders, but the jurisdiction of 
national investigative agencies largely ends at their own geographic boundaries.  Even if a state 
can use the old tests to determine it is the victim of an armed attack in cyberspace, the U.N. 
charter offers no guidance for preventing the spillover of a cyber conflict into neutral, innocent 
states as the victim state seeks to assert its Article 51 rights.  Should states have carte blanche to 
hold neutral nations responsible for an armed cyber attack simply because the electronic signal 
passed through their servers?  The old tests do not apply to the science and methods of cyber 
warfare.  The twin problems of identification of cyber attackers and attribution of identification 
threaten to obliterate any force behind Articles 2(4) and 51. 
 Such problems connecting armed attacks to a single perpetrating state are not new.  
During the Cold War, decades of small-scale proxy conflicts undermined Articles 2(4) and 51, 
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which were written with the massive movements of armies seen during World War II in mind.112  
During conventional wars, “the scale, formations, and strategy…[made] the identification of 
aggression relatively easy.113”  As the superpower belligerents of the cold war squared off 
through “proxy conflicts” in the Middle East, South America, and East Asia, “the small-scale 
and diffuse new wars of insurgency, by their nature, made clear-cut distinctions between 
aggression and self-defense, which are better adapted to conventional military warfare, 
exceedingly difficult.114”  The International Court of Justice was able to use effects-based tests in 
order to find that the United States did not committ an “armed attack” on Nicaragua by supplying 
and supporting the Contra guerrillas,115 but that decision was hotly contested by international 
scholars.116  The advent of cyber warfare has driven a further gulf between the world envisioned 
by the U.N. Charter and modern international relations. 
   
 3.  Definitional Test – An Incomplete Solution 
 
 Some theorists have begun to propose alternative tests to guide states in determining 
when they may resort to the use of force in self-defense in response to a cyber attack.  Of these 
proposed reinterpretations of the Charter, U.S. Air Force Major Graham Todd’s is the most 
creative.  In his proposal, Major Todd recognizes the problems inherent in holding states 
accountable under the Charter for armed attacks in cyberspace, as well as problems of neutrality 
and attribution for the states from which a cyber attack might have originated or passed 
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through.117  Maj Todd looks at principles of criminal law to find a test that provide both clear 
lines of responsibility for states which may use cyberspace to deliver an attack against an enemy 
and a clear standard for a victimized state to employ when deciding if an armed attack has 
occurred and, if so, how and whom to strike back.118 
 Major Todd’s test is twofold.  He analyzes 1) The intent of the party conducting the 
attack, and 2) Knowledge and approval/acquiescence of the state which exercises legal control of 
the actor.119  Combining the two relevant factors, he creates the following test for am armed 
attack in cyberspace:  “A cyberspace attack occurs when a state knowingly uses or knowingly 
acquiesces to an entity under its legal control or within its territory using a cyberspace weapon 
against the people or property of another state.120” 
 Major Todd’s goal is “to develop a framework that inspires states to cooperate to 
eliminate the harmful use of cyberspace-to create deterrence.121”  To that end, he succeeds in 
tying the acts of private actors within the borders of a state to that state’s government as long as 
the government “knowingly acquiesces” to the private actor’s cyberspace attack on another 
state.122  Major Todd’s test, therefore, solves the problem of attribution and neutrality inherent in 
the traditional Effects-Based Tests.  While the effects-based tests do not offer victims of a cyber 
attack a way to determine whether their right to self-defense has been triggered by a cyber attack 
that did not originate directly from the host state or was assisted by the networks of a third-party 
state, Major Todd’s test applies a clear mens rea standard of culpability.123 
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 Does the Definitional Test solve the twin problems of attribution and identification that 
threaten to lead to unpredictable escalations of cyber conflict?  Application of the Stuxnet attack 
Major Todd’s test reveals that, not only does the Definitional Test fail to solve the technological 
and legal barriers to identifying belligerents in cyberspace, it may exacerbate the ultimate danger 
of the current state of U.N. Charter interpretation: An unregulated, rapid expansion of a cyber 
war in both the electronic and physical realms. 
 If Iran had been using Major Todd’s test when the Stuxnet virus revealed itself, they 
would have determined the virus to be an armed attack under the U.N. Charter, thereby 
triggering their right to self-defense.  As described in this paper, Stuxnet was clearly a 
“cyberspace weapon,” designed to seek out and corrupt the software program running the Natanz 
centrifuges, destroying the affected machinery.124  With that question out of the way, Iran would 
have looked for any state that “knowingly use[d] or knowingly acquiesce[d] to an entity under its 
legal control or within its territory.125”  At this point, the Definitional Test begins to fail.   
 If Stuxnet was indeed created by a state actor, as all the evidence suggests, which state 
did it?  How many states let their own intelligence arms cooperate with the primary culprit in 
designing the virus?  Given the political situation, the primary suspects would be the United 
States and Israel, two strategic allies with fully-developed cyber intelligence capabilities.126  
However, the evidence linking the American and Isreali governments to Stuxnet is circumstantial 
at best.127  There is no “Made in Washington/Tel Aviv” stamp in the Stuxnet Code.128  What 
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about Denmark and Taiwan, where Stuxnet’s launching pad servers were located?129  Iran would 
have to investigate whether those two governments acquiesced to the placement of Stuxnet on 
their servers.  While unlikely, such a possibility would be extremely difficult to prove or 
disprove. 
 In this scenario, Iran finds itself in a situation similar to one which would have 
transpired if it were trying to apply one of the Effects-Based Tests: It knows it has been attacked 
by a cyber weapon, but it does not have a clear trail of liability.  However, the Definitional test 
expands liability so far that a victimized nation could plausibly claim Article 51 self-defense 
against any number of ostensibly neutral countries.  The Definitional Test grants a suitably 
belligerent victim the ability to expand a cyber conflict zone, turning a simmering online war 
into one which may embroil many other governments.130  The Definitional Test, as an academic 
exercise, is superior to its Effects-Based predecessors, but it still leaves the management of time-
sensitive crises up to individual states, which may have developed their own independent cyber 
warfare doctrines or even wish to respond to a cyber attack with kinetic military force.131 
 Is the hazy regime of state responsibility envisioned by the Definitional Test an effective 
way to prop up the U.N. Charter in the new age of warfare?  If a “hacktivist” group such as 
Anonymous launched a massive cyber attack against a rival of the United States during a time of 
acute tension, a state following the Definitional Test for an armed attack would be strongly 
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inclined to respond before the “true” culprits could ever be identified.132  Under the Definitional 
Test, the chances of a cyber conflict devolving into a widespread, unregulated war are still too 
high. 
 
IV.  Regulating the New Era of Cyber War 
 
 The development of cyberspace has connected the world in ways that were confined to 
science fiction just two decades ago.  A marked exception to this trend of cooperation and 
interconnectivity is the application of military force through cyberspace.  The interpretive holes 
in the U.N. Charter’s regulations on use of force and self-defense right that developed during the 
Cold War have been blown wide open by the militarization of cyberspace. State governments are 
currently content to operate within their own interpretations of the laws of war and in 
consideration of their individual strengths and interests.   
 The willingness of powerful states to skirt the prohibitions on use of force and armed 
attack in the U.N. Charter is nothing new.  Local conflicts between neighboring belligerents (and 
even conflicts within one country) often became shadow wars, in which the United States and 
Soviet Union funneled money, materiel, and ideology into the conflict.133  As the Nicaragua case 
revealed, the U.N. was unable to stretch the interpretation of Article 2(4) and 51 to cover proxy 
conflicts, even when the entire world knew the driving forces behind the conflict.134  The failure 
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of the U.N. Charter to effectively regulate asymmetric warfare led any scholars to propose that 
any previous inhibitive force exercised by the Charter on belligerent nations had died out.135 
 The international community has a narrow window of opportunity to define the 
parameters for military engagement in cyberspace, thereby saving the U.N. Charter from 
obsolescence and irrelevance.  After the Russo-Georgian War, the Estonia incident, and Stuxnet, 
the issues surrounding the application of the established laws of war have crystallized.  The 
ability to strike an enemy using servers placed around the world or civilian operatives with only 
a tenuous link to any state government continues the progression toward anonymity in use of 
force that developed during the Cold War.   
 With individual nations hoarding their cyber weapons, content to operate in a legal and 
strategic gray area, the U.N. is the most logical place to lay out the rules of war in cyberspace 
before they are established through costly (and potentially bloody) experience.  If a future cyber 
war, or the escalation of a cyber war into a kinetic shooting war, is the event that defines the 
parameters of international cyber conflict, the U.N. will have lost the ability to make a proactive 
mark on the way war is fought in the 21st Century.   
 The most effective scenario is an international agreement adopting a standard of 
responsibility for armed attack in cyberspace that fuses the tough standards of liability for armed 
attack found in Maj Todd’s Definitional Test with a means for victimized nations to quickly 
pinpoint and confront the “true” attacker without waiting for an armed invasion or drawing 
neutral nations into a wider conflict.  In time, technological developments in tracking internet 
signals may make Major Todd’s original approach workable.  In the interim, however, an 
international consensus must be found to prevent shadow wars waged from the electronic 
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darkness of the Internet or, conversely, overreactions from states that find themselves under 
attack from cyberspace. 
  
 Conclusion 
Stuxnet put the world on notice to the maturation of cyber warfare.  With the absence of 
an effective interpretation of Article 51, states are reserving for themselves the right to decide 
when to initiate a cyber war or, if victimized through cyberspace, how to react.  Such a state of 
affairs is untenable and unacceptable.  The persuasive and political force of the U.N. Charter, 
already called into question by its failure to regulate the proxy conflicts of the Cold War, will be 
relegated to obsolescence if the international community cannot act to find an international 
framework for the conduct of war in cyberspace.  In this vacuum, individual states will continue 
to accord in according to their own interpretations of the Charter, which in many cases will be 
little more than articulations of a state’s national interests. Eventually, different interpretations 
will clash, especially if more states begin adopting stricter self-defense doctrines such as the 
Definitional Appproach without an international forum for resolution or effective methods for 
identification of attackers.  
Cyber attacks will play an increasingly central role in the conduct of warfare long into the 
future.  The international community has a rare chance to establish the rules of warfare in a 
world without borders.  In the past, experience with new weapons of war was enough to establish 
their place in the international legal order.  Today, however, geographic borders are giving way 
to interconnected electronic passageways.  Only an international solution can effectively regulate 
a war which can touch any nation in the world at any time.  The time for the U.N. to reassert 
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itself is now.  It must act before wealth, knowledge, and lives are needlessly lost in a conflict 
between states that still play by the old rules.    
